SKILL.md
Implementing Conduit Security for OT Remote Access
When to Use
- When replacing direct VPN connections from IT or vendors into OT control networks
- When implementing IEC 62443-compliant conduit architecture for remote access paths
- When deploying secure remote access for third-party vendor maintenance of ICS equipment
- When building approval-based access workflows for privileged OT system access
- When remediating audit findings about uncontrolled remote access to SCADA systems
Do not use for designing the overall Purdue Model segmentation (see implementing-purdue-model-network-segmentation), for deploying IT-only remote access solutions, or for configuring local console access to PLCs.
Prerequisites
- IT/OT DMZ (Level 3.5) deployed with dual-firewall architecture
- Jump server or privileged access management (PAM) platform (CyberArk, BeyondTrust)
- Multi-factor authentication (MFA) infrastructure for OT remote access users
- Session recording capability for compliance and forensic purposes
- Approval workflow system (ServiceNow, ticketing) for access requests
Workflow
Step 1: Design Conduit Architecture for Remote Access
# IEC 62443 Conduit Security Architecture for OT Remote Access
# All remote access terminates in DMZ - never passes through to OT directly
conduit_architecture:
remote_access_conduit:
conduit_id: "RA-001"
source_zone: "Enterprise IT (Level 4)"
destination_zone: "OT DMZ (Level 3.5)"
security_level_target: "SL3"
components:
external_gateway:
type: "VPN Concentrator"
location: "Enterprise DMZ"
ip: "10.200.1.10"
protocols: ["IPsec", "SSL-VPN"]
authentication: "MFA required (certificate + OTP)"
dmz_jump_server:
type: "Privileged Access Workstation"
location: "OT DMZ (Level 3.5)"
ip: "10.10.150.20"
os: "Windows Server 2022 (hardened)"
controls:
- "Local admin accounts disabled"
- "USB ports disabled"
- "Clipboard transfer disabled by default"
- "Session recording enabled (all keystrokes and screen)"
- "Maximum session duration: 4 hours"
- "Automatic logoff after 15 minutes idle"
- "Application whitelisting enforced"
ot_access_gateway:
type: "Industrial Remote Access Gateway"
location: "OT DMZ / Level 3 boundary"
ip: "10.10.150.25"
controls:
- "Only pre-approved destination IPs reachable"
- "Protocol-level filtering (RDP, SSH, VNC only)"
- "Time-limited sessions with automatic expiry"
- "Approval-based access (plant manager must authorize)"
data_flow:
- step: 1
description: "User authenticates via enterprise VPN with MFA"
source: "Remote user"
destination: "VPN concentrator"
protocol: "IPsec/SSL-VPN"
- step: 2
description: "User connects to jump server in OT DMZ"
source: "VPN tunnel"
destination: "DMZ jump server"
protocol: "RDP with NLA"
- step: 3
description: "From jump server, user accesses specific OT system"
source: "DMZ jump server"
destination: "Approved OT target"
protocol: "RDP/SSH/VNC"
condition: "Only after manager approval and within time window"
prohibited_flows:
- "Direct VPN tunnel from external to Level 1/2 OT devices"
- "Split tunneling allowing internet access during OT session"
- "File transfer from jump server to OT without scanning"
- "Persistent VPN connections (auto-reconnect disabled)"
vendor_access_conduit:
conduit_id: "VA-001"
source_zone: "Vendor External Network"
destination_zone: "OT DMZ (Level 3.5)"
security_level_target: "SL3"
workflow:
request:
- "Vendor submits access request via portal (24h advance)"
- "Request includes: purpose, target systems, duration, personnel"
- "Plant operations manager reviews and approves/rejects"
- "Time-limited credentials generated upon approval"
session:
- "Vendor connects via dedicated vendor VPN gateway"
- "MFA authentication (vendor receives OTP via SMS/app)"
- "Session lands on vendor-specific jump server (isolated from internal jump)"
- "All actions recorded (video + keystroke logging)"
- "OT engineer monitors vendor session in real-time"
termination:
- "Session auto-terminates at approved end time"
- "Credentials automatically revoked"
- "Session recording archived for 90 days"
- "Access log forwarded to SIEM"
