Hunting SaaS SSO Token Abuse

Overview

Adversaries increasingly bypass MFA not by defeating it but by stealing the artifacts issued after a successful authentication — session cookies, OAuth access/refresh tokens, and Primary Refresh Tokens (PRTs). With a stolen token an attacker replays the existing session ("pass-the-cookie" / token replay), inheriting the victim's authenticated state across federated SaaS without ever prompting for credentials or MFA. Mandiant's M-Trends reporting and Microsoft/Okta incident data both highlight token theft as a dominant cloud lateral-movement technique, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK T1550.001 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token.

Detection relies on correlating identity telemetry rather than watching for failed logins. In Microsoft Entra ID the key tables are SigninLogs (interactive), AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs (where replayed cookies/refresh tokens commonly surface), and AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs. Entra now exposes linkable identifiers — SessionId and UniqueTokenIdentifier — that let a hunter stitch every artifact derived from one root authentication event together and spot a single session being used from multiple IPs, ASNs, or device fingerprints. In Okta the System Log carries authentication.sso, policy.evaluate_sign_on, and user.session.start events with a deviceToken/session context; the same session token appearing from divergent IPs/user-agents is the tell. Okta Identity Threat Protection (ITP) can natively flag "suspected session hijacking."

This skill provides a hypothesis-driven hunt: baseline normal session behavior, then look for impossible travel within a single session, refresh-token reuse, token use from anomalous infrastructure (hosting/VPS ASNs), and SaaS access patterns inconsistent with the user's device. Source: MITRE ATT&CK T1550.001; Microsoft Entra ID sign-in log documentation; Okta System Log reference; Mandiant M-Trends.

When to Use

• Threat hunting for MFA-bypass via stolen tokens/cookies across Entra ID and SaaS