Wardn Hub
MCP ServersSkillsCategoriesAPI docsSubmit server
Submit server
Wardn HubTrusted MCP server directory.

Registry

  • MCP Servers
  • Skills
  • Categories

Resources

  • API docs
  • Score method

Contribute

  • Submit server
  • Advertise
© 2026 Wardn Hub
Wardn Hub
MCP ServersSkillsCategoriesAPI docsSubmit server
Submit server
skills/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/auditing-uefi-firmware-with-chipsec

auditing-uefi-firmware-with-chipsec

1
mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills·Security·Audit pending·Snapshot a2acdaef8945

Summary

This source did not publish a separate summary. Review SKILL.md before using the skill.

SKILL.md

Auditing UEFI Firmware with CHIPSEC

Authorized Use Only: CHIPSEC loads a kernel driver and reads/writes low-level hardware registers, SPI flash, and SMM. Run it only on systems you own or are explicitly authorized to assess, ideally on dedicated test hardware. Misuse (especially write/modify modules) can brick a machine. Never run write-capable modules on production systems.

Overview

CHIPSEC is the open-source Platform Security Assessment Framework created by Intel's Advanced Threat Research team. It inspects the low-level security configuration of x86 platform firmware and hardware — the layer below the operating system where bootkits and firmware implants live. CHIPSEC loads a signed kernel driver (Linux, Windows, or it can run from the UEFI shell) to read and write hardware registers, Model-Specific Registers (MSRs), PCI config space, SPI flash, and UEFI variables, then runs an automated test suite that checks whether the platform's defensive locks are actually engaged.

The threat CHIPSEC addresses is MITRE ATT&CK T1542.001 — Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware: adversaries who modify system firmware (the BIOS/UEFI image on SPI flash) to gain stealthy, persistent, OS-survivable control. Firmware implants persist across OS reinstall and disk replacement and are invisible to most EDR. CHIPSEC's value is verifying the prerequisites that prevent such implants: that the SPI flash BIOS region is write-protected (BIOS_CNTL BLE/SMM_BWP, SPI Protected Ranges), that the flash descriptor locks region access, that SMRAM/SMRR are configured, and that Secure Boot variables are protected. It also dumps the SPI flash for offline forensic comparison.

Sources: Intel/CHIPSEC project (https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec), CHIPSEC documentation (https://chipsec.github.io/).

When to Use

  • Baseline firmware-security assessment of a new laptop/server platform or fleet image
  • Verifying that BIOS write protection and SPI flash locks are correctly enabled by the OEM
  • Firmware forensics: dumping SPI flash to compare against a known-good image
  • Validating Secure Boot variable protection and S3 boot-script protection
  • Hunting for evidence of a firmware implant or misconfiguration enabling one
  • Prerequisites

    • Physical or admin/root access to the target x86 platform (Intel or AMD)
    • Linux (root) or Windows (Administrator), or a UEFI shell environment
    • Ability to load a kernel driver (Secure Boot may need to allow the CHIPSEC driver, or use --no_driver for limited checks)
    • Python 3.8+ and a C compiler/build tools for the kernel module on Linux
    • Dedicated test hardware strongly recommended

    Install CHIPSEC:

    # From PyPI
    pip install chipsec
    
    # Or from source (builds the kernel helper/driver)
    git clone https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec
    cd chipsec
    python setup.py install        # builds and installs, including the Linux driver
    
    # Verify
    sudo chipsec_main --help
    sudo chipsec_util --help
    

    Objectives

    • Run the full automated platform-security test suite and interpret PASS/FAIL/WARNING
    • Verify BIOS write protection (BIOS_CNTL) and SPI Protected Ranges
    • Verify the SPI flash descriptor locks region read/write access
    • Verify SMRAM/SMRR and SMI handler protections
    • Verify Secure Boot variable protection and S3 boot-script protection
    • Dump SPI flash and decode it for offline analysis
    • Enumerate UEFI variables and detect anomalous/unexpected entries

    MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

    Technique IDNameTactic
    T1542.001Pre-OS Boot: System FirmwarePersistence / Defense Evasion

    CHIPSEC defends against T1542.001 by verifying that the controls preventing unauthorized firmware modification are enabled. A FAIL on common.bios_wp (BIOS not write-protected) or chipsec.modules.common.spi_lock (flash descriptor unlocked) means an attacker with OS privileges could rewrite the SPI flash and implant persistent firmware — exactly the precondition for this technique.

    Workflow

    Step 1: Run the full automated test suite

    chipsec_main with no module argument runs every applicable security check for the detected platform and prints a summary of PASS/FAIL/WARNING/INFORMATION results.

    sudo chipsec_main
    
    # Save machine-readable output for reporting / diffing
    sudo chipsec_main -j results.json -x results.xml -l chipsec.log
    

    Step 2: Run the core firmware-protection modules individually

    The common module group contains the OEM-independent security checks. Run the group or specific modules:

    # Run the whole common group
    sudo chipsec_main -m common
    
    # BIOS write protection: checks BIOS_CNTL BLE/SMM_BWP and SPI protected ranges
    sudo chipsec_main -m common.bios_wp
    
    # SPI flash descriptor lock (FLOCKDN) — are flash region accesses locked?
    sudo chipsec_main -m common.spi_lock
    
    # SMRR programming — protects SMRAM from cache-based attacks
    sudo chipsec_main -m common.smrr
    
    # SMM BIOS write protection
    sudo chipsec_main -m common.smm
    
    # S3 resume boot-script protection (against bootscript table attacks)
    sudo chipsec_main -m common.uefi.s3bootscript
    

    Step 3: Verify Secure Boot variable protection

    # Checks that Secure Boot UEFI variables are properly protected
    sudo chipsec_main -m common.secureboot.variables
    
    # To actively test write protection of the variables (test hardware ONLY):
    sudo chipsec_main -m common.secureboot.variables -a modify
    

    Step 4: Inspect SPI flash region access permissions

    # Report SPI flash regions, descriptor, and access permissions
    sudo chipsec_util spi info
    
    # Check the SPI access-control module
    sudo chipsec_main -m common.spi_access
    

    Step 5: Dump SPI flash for offline forensics

    Dumping the flash lets you decode the firmware volumes and compare against a known-good OEM image.

    # Dump the entire SPI flash to a file
    sudo chipsec_util spi dump rom.bin
    
    # Decode the dumped image: extracts firmware volumes, files, NVRAM variables, etc.
    sudo chipsec_util decode rom.bin
    

    Step 6: Enumerate and triage UEFI variables

    # List all UEFI variables from the runtime interface
    sudo chipsec_util uefi var-list
    
    # List variables directly from the SPI image (offline)
    sudo chipsec_util uefi var-find PK
    sudo chipsec_util uefi var-read db <GUID> db.bin
    
    # Decode the UEFI firmware structure
    sudo chipsec_util uefi decode rom.bin
    

    Step 7: Limited assessment without a kernel driver

    Where loading the driver is impossible (locked-down Secure Boot), some checks still run read-only.

    sudo chipsec_main -n            # --no_driver: skip checks that need the driver
    sudo chipsec_main -p <PLATFORM> # force platform code if auto-detect fails
    

    Step 8: Triage results and report

    • FAIL on bios_wp / spi_lock → firmware is rewritable from the OS: high risk for T1542.001.
    • FAIL on secureboot.variables → Secure Boot policy can be tampered.
    • Compare the spi dump against the OEM's known-good image (hash firmware volumes) to detect unauthorized modification.
    • Record platform, BIOS version, and every FAIL/WARNING with the relevant register values for the report.

    Tools and Resources

    ToolPurposeSource
    chipsec_mainAutomated platform-security test suitehttps://github.com/chipsec/chipsec
    chipsec_utilManual hardware/firmware access (spi, uefi, decode)https://chipsec.github.io/
    UEFIToolGUI/CLI parsing of dumped UEFI imageshttps://github.com/LongSoft/UEFITool
    Binarly fwhuntFirmware vulnerability/implant hunting ruleshttps://github.com/binarly-io/fwhunt-scan
    NSA UEFI Secure Boot guidanceHardening referencehttps://media.defense.gov/

    Core Module Reference

    ModuleChecks
    common.bios_wpBIOS_CNTL BLE / SMM_BWP and SPI Protected Ranges
    common.spi_lockSPI flash descriptor FLOCKDN
    common.spi_accessSPI flash region read/write permissions
    common.smrrSystem Management Range Registers programming
    common.smmSMM BIOS write protection
    common.secureboot.variablesSecure Boot variable protection
    common.uefi.s3bootscriptS3 resume boot-script protection

    Validation Criteria

    • CHIPSEC installed and driver loads (or -n documented if not)
    • Full chipsec_main suite executed with JSON/XML/log output saved
    • common.bios_wp result interpreted (write protection state)
    • common.spi_lock / spi_access result interpreted (descriptor lock)
    • SMRR/SMM module results recorded
    • Secure Boot variable protection checked
    • SPI flash dumped and decoded for offline analysis
    • UEFI variables enumerated and triaged
    • All FAIL/WARNING findings documented with platform/BIOS version
    • Write/modify modules NOT run on production hardware

    Related skills

    securing-github-actions-workflowsimplementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetesAbuse of Public-Facing API: Mobile API AbuseAccess with Stolen Session CookieAccess with Stolen Session Cookie