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SKILL.md
Analyzing Windows Shellbag Artifacts
Overview
Shellbags are Windows registry artifacts that track how users interact with folders through Windows Explorer, storing view settings such as icon size, window position, sort order, and view mode. From a forensic perspective, Shellbags provide definitive evidence of folder access -- even folders that no longer exist on the system. When a user browses to a folder via Windows Explorer, the Open/Save dialog, or the Control Panel, a Shellbag entry is created or updated in the user's registry hive. These entries persist after folder deletion, drive disconnection, and even across user profile resets, making them invaluable for proving that a user navigated to specific directories on local drives, USB devices, network shares, or zip archives.
When to Use
When investigating security incidents that require analyzing windows shellbag artifacts
When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
Familiarity with digital forensics concepts and tools
Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
Appropriate authorization for any testing activities
Registry Locations
Windows 7/8/10/11
Hive
Key Path
Stores
NTUSER.DAT
Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU
Folder hierarchy tree
NTUSER.DAT
Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags
View settings per folder
UsrClass.dat
Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU
Desktop/Explorer shell
UsrClass.dat
Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags
Additional view settings
BagMRU Structure
The BagMRU key contains a hierarchical tree of numbered subkeys representing the directory structure. Each subkey value contains a Shell Item (SHITEMID) binary blob encoding the folder identity:
Root (BagMRU): Desktop namespace root
BagMRU\0: Typically "My Computer"
BagMRU\0\0: First drive (e.g., C:)
BagMRU\0\0\0: First subfolder on C:
Each Shell Item contains:
Item type (folder, drive, network, zip, control panel)
Short name (8.3 format)
Long name (Unicode)
Creation/modification timestamps
MFT entry/sequence for NTFS folders
Analysis with EZ Tools
SBECmd (Command Line)
# Parse shellbags from a directory of registry hives
SBECmd.exe -d "C:\Evidence\Registry" --csv C:\Output --csvf shellbags.csv
# Parse from a live system (requires admin)
SBECmd.exe --live --csv C:\Output --csvf live_shellbags.csv
# Key output columns:
# AbsolutePath - Full reconstructed path
# CreatedOn - When the folder was first browsed
# ModifiedOn - When view settings were last changed
# AccessedOn - Last access timestamp
# ShellType - Type of shell item (Directory, Drive, Network, etc.)
# Value - Raw shell item data
ShellBags Explorer (GUI)
# Launch GUI tool for interactive analysis
ShellBagsExplorer.exe
# Load registry hives: File > Load Hive
# Navigate the tree structure to see folder hierarchy
# Right-click entries for detailed shell item properties
Forensic Investigation Scenarios
Proving USB Device Browsing
Shellbag Path: My Computer\E:\Confidential\Project_Files
ShellType: Directory (on removable volume)
CreatedOn: 2025-03-15 09:30:00 UTC
This proves the user navigated to E:\Confidential\Project_Files
via Windows Explorer, even if the USB drive is no longer connected.
The volume letter E: and directory timestamps can be correlated
with USBSTOR and MountPoints2 registry entries.
Detecting Network Share Access
Shellbag Path: \\FileServer01\Finance\Q4_Reports
ShellType: Network Location
AccessedOn: 2025-02-20 14:15:00 UTC
This proves the user browsed to a network share, even if
the share has been decommissioned or access revoked.
Identifying Deleted Folder Knowledge
Shellbag Path: C:\Users\suspect\Documents\Exfiltration_Staging
ShellType: Directory
CreatedOn: 2025-01-10 08:00:00 UTC
Even though C:\Users\suspect\Documents\Exfiltration_Staging
no longer exists, the Shellbag entry proves the user
created and navigated to this folder.
Limitations
Shellbags only record folder-level interactions, not individual file access
Only created through Windows Explorer shell and Open/Save dialogs
Command-line access (cmd, PowerShell) does not generate Shellbag entries
Programmatic file access via APIs does not generate Shellbag entries
Timestamps may reflect view setting changes, not necessarily folder access
Windows may batch-update Shellbag entries during Explorer shutdown